Reexamining fiat, bona fide, and force dynamic boundaries for geopolitical entities and their placement in DOLCE

Review 1 by Simon Scheider

The author has largely revised his manuscript, rendering it better readable, and with a stronger and clearer argumentation for his idea to consider all political boundaries as fiat entities. He also makes a suggestion to place geopolitical concepts in the DOLCE ontology. Furthermore, the paper now makes a strong case for a possible revision of DOLCE's physical non-physical distinction: Political boundaries are social constructs with obvious spatial locations, whereas DOLCE allows only physical endurants to have spatial locations. This was one of my main concerns in the first round.

In my view, the physical non-physical distinction is indeed one of the weaknesses of DOLCE, whereas the ideas of features, unity of objects and others are among its main strengths. Many geospatial concepts hopelessly hover in the shaded borderland between the physical and the non-physical. Consider e.g. the notion of "place", which can denote a socially established thing but still needs to have a physical location. So I welcome this necessary discussion to which the author has added a strong case. Also, his suggestion of dropping the physical-non-physical distinction in terms of location is worth considering, while I'm less sure about his suggestion of distinguishing the physical in terms of matter.

While it is an open question how social objects come to have locations, it seems that the DOLCE conformant way of keeping for each social object a physical correspondent that accounts for its location is not cognitively adequate: what should this correspondent thing be in the case of a territory?

I therefore appreciate the publication of the manuscript, while some minor comments should be addressed:

Secion 4.1: "Second, this classification does recognize the distinction between the boundary of the state's territory [....] and the boundary *of the island*" ... *of a physical object, e.g. an island*?

Section 5.2: Features require objects as hosts. But this does not mean that the hosts of boundaries need to be territories, and thus territories need to exist. There is also the possibility that the hosts of boundaries are other objects that indicate its position, e.g. a river or a demarcation line like the Berlin wall.

Secion 5.3: "Thus even if the subsumption relation between Non-Physical Object and Social were revised to allow [...], the contradiction would be allowed in again by allowing ..." Besides this is terrible English, the contradiction does not appear since once you have physical objects (the territories), they are bound to have only physical features (their boundaries).

Section 5.4: It would be helpful to say explicitly whether "hasTerritory" and "hasBoundary" require a range entity for every domain entity (existential dependence). I guess for the first one this is definitely not the case.

Review 2 by Femke Reitsma

My thanks to the author for considering my comments and responding. I'm still not entirely convinced that it is quite ripe for publication, and believe that it would make a much higher quality piece of work once further developed with the ontology, and consequently meet a better standard for minimum publishable units.

Regarding your response, you've responded to my comments in your letter, but I would imagine others might have similar questions or be similarly confused, so it would be good if you could somehow address these comments in the paper. This may mean an extra sentence or few words here and there, such as a brief mention on how you think scale is not relevant.

My final comment regards your repeated mention of cartographic representation. Is this paper about the cartographic representation of geopolitical boundaries or the geopolitical boundaries themselves. I had though the latter but am now confused - and this I think is somewhat significant for the paper.

The reviews listed below are for the original submission. The PDF version is the new submission which is currently under review.

Review 1 by Simon Scheider

A consistent ontology of geopolitical entities may be helpful for the semantic web. It has at least been identified as a challenging subject of ontological research. This article makes a good step towards it.

The article makes a convincing case for regarding state territories and their boundaries as 3-D resp. 2-D fiat entities (i.e., entities established via social convention). In this view, natural (bona fide) and force dynamic boundaries may exist simultaneously, but differ ontologically from territorial boundaries. This stands in contrast to Smith's "cognitive geometry of war", where state territories can have all types of boundaries and can be converted into each other.

In general, the article is well written and contains convincing argumentation for ontological decisions taken based on examples. These are my main points of critique:

- At times, the author slightly overdoes it: the argumentation could be shortened and made more concise, especially in the escalating Section 4. Also, the writing style should become more clear and readable, avoiding sentences as: "... he [Smith] never reconciles this with this statement about the essential nature of force dynamic boundaries coming first." (p. 8 in 4.3)

- In my view, the argument for states being legal persons of international law does not necessarily contradict the idea of states as organisations (argued for in another paper of the author and adopted here). Bottazzi's [4] account of organisations regards them as social individuals with representatives acting on their behalf on the international level. Regarding states as organisations has the advantage that the whole apparatus of norms and roles comes for free.

- In Section 5, I guess what Mark et al.[15] mean is that geo objects are immovable "relative to the earth", indeed. This leaves the whole section a bit pointless.

- I agree with the author that territories and their boundaries could be regarded as social objects in DOLCE in Section 6 (I'm not an expert on BFO, so I will leave section 7 uncommented), and should not be confused with their locations. Still, there is the problem of how these social objects come to have locations, as social objects in DOLCE cannot have physical qualities, at least not directly. The author should at least indicate what kind of a solution he envisions, since this seems a fundamental aspect of territories. My suggestion would be to consider the physical bearers of territory locations as places. Places can be considered independent physical objects with locations, they may be moved, and they may be conventionally established (Scheider, Janowicz (2010): Places as media of containment). Therefore, they may also be established via the conventional territory of a state.

- Figure 2 depicts exactly the same BFO scheme as Figure 3. From the text, it rather seems that the intended DOLCE figure is missing?

- Since the author obviously does not suggest a solution of where to put states in DOLCE (which is regrettable), it should not be promised in the abstract.

Review 2 by Femke Reitsma

The paper is well written and presents a consideration of previous work by Smith on an ontology for geopolitical entities, extending this work to present the beginnings of an ontology for geopolitical entities and its relationship to two existing upper level ontologies (DOLCE and BFO). While lengthy and well referenced, I don't believe the paper significantly contributes new research to warrant a paper at this stage. There is great potential in what has been presented, but the work needs further development.

I'm not entirely convinced that another domain ontology makes for a paper, however, it would make for a more complete piece of work, where as you state in your concluding section, a domain ontology for geopolitical entities is for further research. Rather than spending half of the article rebutting Smith's definitions of geopolitical entities, which appears to already have been done by Montello, as you mention, just present your theory. Rather than describe every stage of research and every step of your thought process, describe the results of your work, e.g. the upper level ontology you found to be best, reasons why, and your domain ontology. The creation of your own geopolitical ontology as a result of significant piece of research, could be presented in a paper and might include properties of entities, examples of reasoning, and scenarios or use cases which show its use or purpose. I believe this would make for a publishable unit and would more completely flesh out what you have begun.

In terms of content, you may also want to think about the importance of scale in defining boundaries, e.g. even a bona-fide seeming boundary defined by a river or an ocean is problematic as these are dynamic entities, and at certain scales change dramatically. Are the boundaries of these entities then defined based on a certain scale?

And how does the dynamic nature of boundaries fit in? Another scale dependent thing? For example, the bottom of NZ moved 30cm closer to Australia last year due to a large earthquake. Oddly enough you recognise this dynamic nature of geographic objects in section 5, but don't use it earlier in your explanation.

Your boundary figure (figure 1) defining the bounds of a state territory, doesn't include geological boundaries, i.e. those explored by mining and deep sea drilling. The surface fo the earth is not typically seen as a boundary, which you note in the text, but don't represent in the figure.

Regarding paper form, for all quotes you need to include the page number from where they are sourced. Also, the last two figures should be positioned closer to where they are first mentioned in the text.

Review 3 by Laure Vieu
This paper is an essay in the ontology of geopolitical entities, and by extension, social entities. It extends the author's previous work [22] and builds (mainly) on work by B. Smith [25, 31].
In addition to introduce a number of very useful clarifications and new distinctions, the main result of the paper is to show that there is no such a thing as states having "bona fide" boundaries, against Smith in [25].
Although the topic can be seen as rather narrow and the results not so much ground breaking, the in-depth discussion is a good example that proposing an ontology of social entities like states and its territories, something essential for any application in geopolitics, is not a trivial matter.
For this reason, I recommend the publication of this paper.
However, there are a number of errors to correct. In addition, an important assumption is lacking argumentation altogether: the need to grant ontological dignity to state territories, considering them as individuals persisting through time, rather than considering "territory-of" as a function or role.
I therefore would very much like to see the issues described in the comments below addressed in the final paper. Some other comments are of lesser importance.

Main comments:

P.4 You insist much on the extension of an island state's territory into sea to undermine Smith's claim that it is has bona fide boundaries. But you do not take issue regarding the status of implicit geometrical "boundaries" like those corresponding to maritime territory (at least not on p.4, while on p.12 you surprisingly hold that they are not fiat --more on this point later). Since, moreover, the main argument against bona fide states actually lies elsewhere, this emphasis only blurs the essential point. This point is an ontological one (not a factual one), applicable to both island states and inland ones. It is the fact that territory boundaries are all the product of human cognition, thus fiat, whether or not they "follow" a discontinuity in the physical world, as argued in [17]. As it is in my opinion an essential element in your paper, it deserves more focus than it has now.
And regarding the many-island states like Japan, in addition to (or instead of?) focusing on the connectedness of the territory, you could point out that which islands to include or not in the plurality of islands covered by the state's territory also is a human decision.

P.10 The argument at the end of Section 5, based on the fact that the earth moves so no state is twice at the same location is spurious, I recommend to simply drop it. The motion of any entity is relative to some other one, or to some reference frame anchored at some other one. Each reference frame yields a different (point of view on) space and different "locations". "There" in "it would require a spaceship to return there" is not defined without a reference frame (is "there" defined with respect to our solar system, our galaxy, our cluster of galaxies, or something else yet?). I believe one can take for granted that all reference frames relevant to geopolitical ontology are anchored to the earth.

P.10, Section 6. Before discussing the nature of territories, you should first of all argue for the existence of such entities. What distinguishes "the place of this chair" from "the territory of this state"? The first is standardly analyzed using a location function (directly or through the quality scheme in DOLCE) that takes different values (space regions) at different times, so there is no additional single entity corresponding to "the place of this chair" that would itself move in space. Similarly, nouns such as "president" or "husband" are acknowledged as roles, without (in most accounts) introducing an additional entity that would move in time from one person to another. You should carefully argue why "territory-of" shouldn't be considered as a function or a role applied to states (whose values or players' nature --space region, physical endurant or something else-- would of course remain to be discussed) and why it is necessary that "the territory of this state" refer to a same (moving) individual at all times the state exists.
I'm not implying here that I believe the assumption to be wrong. But a paper dedicated to the ontological nature of state territories cannot take it for granted, avoiding this discussion.

P.11-12, Section 6.2. The argument in the last two paragraphs (moving physical material out of the boundaries does not cause the state to gain or lose parts) doesn't show that a territory (assuming this is a single persisting entity) is not a physical object in DOLCE, it only shows it is not an amount of matter. A physical object can be constituted by different amounts of matter (M) at different times, with the second M being a proper part of the first, without necessarily loosing itself a part. For, contrary to what you seem to assume, in DOLCE there is no axiom to guarantee that to any part of the constituting object corresponds a part in the object constituted. The converse of (Ad29) in D18 is not assumed. Of course you can discuss whether a stronger link between parthood and constitution than assumed by DOLCE is needed. But with DOLCE as is, your argument doesn't go through.
Methodologically, you should stick to what distinguishes physical endurants (PED) from non-physical ones (NPED) in DOLCE, namely having a spatial location in a direct way. If there are such things as state territories, there is no doubt that these are directly located in space (no less than a physical object like a chair does), so from DOLCE's point of view it is quite obvious that state territories are PED.
There certainly is an argument, though, in favour of considering state territories as social objects, something you could have pointed out rather than just stating that you decide to place them so. Although social objects are little studied and characterized in DOLCE, the only axiom about them is that they depend on a society. Since this property would clearly apply to state territories, NASO indeed is a good candidate to subsume state territories.
So, what your study would show is that the assumption made in DOLCE that social objects are all non physical endurants (ie, NPED subsumes SOB) may need to be reconsidered. This assumption is little argued for in DOLCE, DOLCE just more or less implicitly assumes that all social entities depend on physical ones and not the other way around.
Of course, all this is provided that territories are given a first-class ontological status, which is yet to be argued for.

P.12-13 Section 6.4 (and the first paragraph of Section 7) has to be rewritten, as you seem to have missed the fact that in DOLCE, (physical) boundaries are placed in the category of features (F), subsumed by PED (see Table 1 p.15 in D18). It is also envisaged that non-physical features should be added under NPED (see section 3.4.1, pp.22-23 of D18), so non-physical boundaries also have an implicit location in DOLCE. Admittedly, this is not a single category, but you shouldn't put physical boundaries under NAPO, nor social boundaries under NASO.
Anyway, implicit "boundaries" are surely not private mental objects (MOB), at least without changing DOLCE axioms. These entities are dependent on societies, so perhaps generically dependent on the minds of the agentive physical objects member of such societies, but not specifically dependent on a particular mind, as required by axiom (Ad71) for MOB.

P.12-13 I do not understand your argument for implicit geometrical "boundaries" not being fiat. You haven't really questioned the definition of fiat and bona fide boundaries as used in [31], and there, a prototypical example of fiat boundary is the boundary between the upper and lower hemispheres of the earth [31, p.1]. Such a boundary is geometrically determined from the poles on the earth's boundary. That you cannot declare, "by fiat" that the boundary between the two hemispheres has moved north or south, because the very notion of hemispheres would be altered, doesn't change the fact that it is fiat. So of course by definition a "boundary" 10 miles offshore cannot be moved to 5 miles, but this is irrelevant for negating its fiatness.
In my view there is little or no difference between arbitrary curves on the earth surface such as meridians and implicit geometrical "boundaries" such as the curve, say, 10 miles offshore of a given island. I suppose the latter curve could deserve the "boundary" name if it is used to define the boundaries of the maritime territory of the island. But then, another curve one mile further no longer coincides with the boundary of anything, and has no justification for being called so. This is in line with your comment at the end of Section 7, but why not discussing this fully much earlier in Section 4.1?

Other comments:

Whole paper: why "bona fide" in italics and "fiat" in roman? Both are latin, one would expect a similar treatment for both.

P.4, On the argument based on the extension of a state's territory into sea, into air, and under ground: please discuss whether there is indeed, as you seem to assume, a unique sense of "territory" from a linguistic point of view and from the legal / political geography one. It seems likely to me that there is a usual sense limited to land (ie, earth's surface not under water), and an extended sense covering other kinds of "places", available in some contexts only.

P.4 continuous / discontinuous: please consider using connected / disconnected instead, something which has a definite topological sense (continuity in mathematics refers to something else).

P.4, bottom: isn't the formulation that some shogunates were at times "discontinuous across several islands" in contradiction with your earlier argument that Japan is continuous? (I understand your point here, but this formulation seems to me infelicitous).

P.5, 3rd §, "The second assumption": not clear at that point what the first is.

P.6 and p.7, two occurrences of "covert" instead of, I believe, "convert".

P.10-11, Section 6.1. In DOLCE, abstract entities are mainly characterized as not being in time. You could use the (more) basic argument that a state's territory, if it exists (cf. above), surely is in time, rather than indirectly referring to it through the parthood argument structure.

P.11 I very much question your statement "potentially, it is even possible to remove all of the physical material from within the state's territorial boundaries and not affect the existence of the state's territory", because it is at odds with the unquestionable fact that all state territories depend on (portions of the surface of) the earth, which certainly does (generically) depend on amounts of matter. For sure, if you remove all the matter of the planet earth, there is no earth and no territory at all. And since you argue before that a territory spans down to the center of the earth, "to remove all of the physical material from within the state's territorial boundaries" is not a light hypothesis.

Fig. 2 is the same as Fig.3, so it depicts the BFO taxonomy, not DOLCE's contrary to what both the caption and the text say.

P.14 "as argument against bona fide state territory has been made" -> "an argument ..."